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On May 29, 2005, French citizens voted to reject the proposed Constitutional Treaty for 
Europe.  The empirical center of this article is the French National Front’s post-
referendum claiming of the “No” vote as it looked forward to the 2007 French 
Presidential elections.  April 21, 2002, the date that Jean Marie Le Pen came in second in 
the first round of the Presidential elections, emerged in the pre and post referendum 
period as an iconic event, a form of history as political metaphor, that all sides deployed 
to structure arguments about the future of France and the future of Europe.  This article 
first explores the pre and post referendum discussion of the constitution; second, turns to 
the French and European context to situate the vote; and third, explores the landscape of 
political possibilities that the vote and its aftermath presented.   
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 THE FRENCH REFERENDUM ON THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 
 
In his classic lecture, “What is a Nation?” Ernest Renan  ([1882] 1996) remarked, 
“A community of interest is assuredly a powerful bond between men.  Do interests, 
however, suffice to make a nation?  I do not think so.  Community of interest brings 
about trade agreements, but nationality has a sentimental side to it; it is both soul and 
body at once; a Zollverein is not a patrie (51).”  His remark juxtaposed a community of 
contract, the Zollverein, against a community of culture the patrie.  Renan was speaking 
in 1882 in the wake of France’s loss of Alsace Lorraine to Germany.  The tension 
between interest, and its formal articulations (i.e., rationality, contract, market), and 
culture has salience for contemporary French politics as well as the European project. 
The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (CIG 86/04 2004) issued in 
Brussels on June 25, 2004 implicitly underscored the opposition of interest to culture.  
The Preamble points to the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance” of Europe that 
survived collective “bitter experiences” and gave birth to a “common destiny.”  Europe 
‘united in diversity’ offers the “best chance” of a democratic European future.  The 
opening sections of the draft constitution, Title I and II, continued a more refined 
specification of common European “values,” but the remaining 300 pages of the 
document consisted of detailed technical descriptions of institutional arrangements. 
The most optimistic architects of Europe, such as Jean Monnet and Robert 
Schuman, never imagined a patrie.  They also never imagined market fundamentalism, 
globalization and neo-liberalism.  The founding vision of Europe, consolidated in the 
1957 Treaty of Rome, was liberal in the social democratic sense, national and Western 
European.  The citizens of France and the Netherlands had no difficulty in imagining a 
patrie, the political culture of their own nation states, and reading their social insecurities 
in the neo-liberal rule book that they perceived the constitution to be.  On May 29, 2005, 
70% of the French population turned out to vote on the following question: “Do you 
approve a bill [le projet de loi] that authorizes the ratification of a treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe?”.  The French voted to reject the European Constitution by a 
decisive 55.6%.  Two days later, 62% of the Dutch voted to reject the Constitution.  One 
month later, British Prime Minister Tony Blair who was considering a referendum in 
2006 drew back to his original position that Britain did not need to sign on to the 
Constitution.  Within less than a month, the core members of “old” Europe had placed the 
key symbolic document of “new” Europe on indefinite hold.  
French president Jacques Chirac proposed to submit the treaty to a popular 
referendum in the spring of 2004, in part because his political gambit did not appear to 
have a high risk of failure.  France had been a central architect of the project of European 
integration, its former president Valéry Giscard D’Estaing had chaired the committee that 
drafted the constitution and French citizens had a history of affirming Europe—even if 
they did so at the margins as in the vote for the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.  A less 
tangible factor than past experience fueled the optimism of French elites towards the 
referendum.  To reject the European Constitution would be a recidivist move that would 
compromise France’s prestige within the European community and chip away at its 
national self image as a cosmopolitan and progressive polity.  The initial confidence 
among French intellectual and political elites that the referendum would succeed was in 
inverse proportion to the intensity of collective surprise and shock when it failed.      
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 In the immediate aftermath of the French vote, public discussion within France as 
well as in Europe and in the United States focused upon the impact that the French 
rejection would have on the European project.  The Economist (June 6, 2005) graphically 
captured the spirit of this commentary.  An image of Jean-Louis David’s painting of the 
assassinated Marat in his bath adorned its post-referendum cover.  The cover headline 
proclaimed in bold letters, “The Europe that Died” followed in small letters by “and the 
one to save.”  The letter that his assassin Charlotte Corday presented to gain entrée to his 
chamber lies in Marat’s lifeless hand.  The cover is a thinly veiled comment on the 
treachery embedded in the rejection of the Constitution.   
The headline of Le Monde on May 31 2005 proclaimed, “Chirac disavowed, 
Europe destabilized.”  A cartoon image depicted the word “non” with an exclamation 
point floating on a sea.  France is drawn as an island in the center of the “o” and the ship 
of Europe is in the background sailing away without the bickering French.   Richard 
Bernstein writing in The International Herald Tribune (June 3, 2005, 2), asserted “50 
Years of Rationality interrupted in France.”  David Brooks (2005), New York Times 
opinion writer asserted that “fear” rather than “hope” governs how Europeans view their 
future.  Brooks claimed that “the [European] liberal project of the postwar era has bred a 
stultifying conservatism, a fear of dynamic flexibility, a greater concern for guarding 
what exists than for creating what doesn’t.”  
German historian and public intellectual Michael Sturmer argued in the Wall 
Street Journal (May 31, 2005, A16) that the “non” was a course correction on 
bureaucratic hubris and the over-confidence of political elites.  In Sturmer’s view, the 
principal difficulty was that the French, and later Dutch, “no” slowed the momentum on 
talks scheduled to begin on October 3, 2005 on the staging of Turkey’s entrance to the 
EU.  Sturmer emphasized the fact that the EU constitution merely consolidated a series of 
treaties that are still in effect and will continue to be in effect independently of the 
outcome of the referenda.  On a more emotional note, British historian and political 
commentator, Timothy Garton Ash (2005) warned in an article in The Guardian that the 
rejection of the constitution suggested a “declining civilization” and sent him back to 
reading the work of Arnold Toynbee.    
In a series of political commentaries appearing in the Financial Times (June 14, 
2005) and Prospect (July 2005) among other venues, Andrew Moravcsik (author of the 
standard political history of the European project, The Choice for Europe [1998]) argued 
that “Europe works well without the grand illusions.”2  Reasoning in the same vein as 
Sturmer, Moravcsik notes that the Constitutional Treaty summarized but did not 
supersede previous treaties so that in the long run the future of Europe as a project did not 
depend on a formal constitution.  More importantly, he argued that the technical details of 
the Constitution were not particularly engaging for the majority of European citizens.  In 
short, the Constitutional treaty was not a charismatic document.  According to 
Moravcsik, submitting the Constitution to a popular referendum made the idea of Europe 
fodder for the extreme ideologies of “grumpy populists” who mapped their national 
discontents and fears on to the opaque and bureaucratic prose of the Constitution.   
This article takes the position that “grumpy populists” matter.  In the last ten 
years, left and right populism has become politically salient in Europe as elsewhere.  
Right populist parties, such as the French National Front, have re-asserted the national 
                                                 
2   Moravcsik (2006) covers the same territory in academic language. 
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 and challenged the accelerated process of European integration that the Constitution 
represented.  How and why “grumpy populists” matter is crucial not only to 
understanding the emergent European phenomenon of populism but also to envisioning 
national and European political, social and cultural possibilities.   
The empirical center of this article is the French National Front’s post-referendum 
claiming of the “Non” as it looked forward to the 2007 French Presidential elections.  
April 21, 2002, the date that Jean Marie Le Pen came in second in the first round of the 
Presidential elections, emerged in the pre and post referendum period as an iconic event, 
a form of history as political metaphor, that all sides deployed to structure arguments 
about the future of France and the future of Europe.  This article first explores the pre and 
post referendum discussion of the constitution; second, turns to the French and European 
context to situate the vote; and third, explores the landscape of political possibilities that 
the vote and its aftermath presented.   
 
CONCEPTUALIZING THE “NON:”   EVENT, EVALUATION AND EMOTION 
 
The French said “no” to the draft treaty and “yes” to a multiplicity of collective 
meanings and contradictions.  The referendum and its defeat in France served as a 
crucible, an interpretive space, that generated an array of public discussions, claims and 
counter-claims that underscored the cultural, social and economic fissures that are 
constitutive of the expanded process of Europeanization (for a summary and definition, 
see Borneman and Fowler 1997).  The French “non” has meaning that extends beyond 
France.  It dramatizes the tension between national and European politics, between the 
emotive and the rational, culture and the market, that has played itself out in some degree 
all over Europe in the past ten years (Berezin 2003; 2006).   
Borrowing from sociologist Emile Durkheim ([1895]1966), this article treats the 
“non” as a “social fact”—that is as an event that has ramifications that extend beyond its 
present moment.  A national referendum on a constitution involves events, evaluations 
and emotions.  Historical sociologists (Sewell 2005; Abbott 2001) have recently argued 
that events as units of analysis yield more robust forms of political cultural explanation.  
Sewell’s (1996) thick description of the storming of the Bastille as a unitary event 
permits him to develop a nuanced account of a larger phenomenon the French Revolution 
than traditional analyses that limits itself to causes and consequences.3     
Every event has a front story and a back story.  The front story is the simple and 
immediate explanation of outcomes.  With regard to the “non,” the front story, the one 
repeated over and over in the newspapers, is straightforward and confirmed by opinion 
polls in the immediate aftermath of the vote.  Unemployment and fear of unemployment 
were the principle reasons that citizens gave for voting “non” in France, followed by a 
general discontent with the government.4  While unemployment is not the whole story, it 
is certainly part of the story of the defeat of the referendum.   OECD (2005)’s annual 
                                                 
3   This approach differs from path dependence which also relies on events as a unit of analysis but views 
them as causally connected in a temporally linked sequence.  See Pierson (2004); Bates, et. al. (1998). 
4   For example, the day after the referendum, Le Monde (5/30/05) reported “La crainte pour l’emploi est la 
raison principale du rejet de la Constitution par les Francais.” Eurobarometer (European Commission 
2005) reported the following economic reasons for the “no” vote: loss of jobs (31%); fear of unemployment 
(26%); dislike of the “liberal text” (19%); weakens “social Europe” (16%). 
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 economic survey of France released shortly after the referendum notes that the 
unemployment rate in France for 2004-05 was 10% and that it had not been below 8% for 
twenty years. 
Unemployment is also part of the back story of the “non” vote.  It achieves a 
different interpretive valence depending on which political party or group is deploying it.  
In contrast to the front story that focuses on explanation, the back story describes the 
context in which events take place.  Analysis of context situates the referendum vote in a 
broader stream of French and European events.  A contextual approach permits a thicker 
account of the French referendum than the partial, if parsimonious, explanations that 
surveys taken in the immediate aftermath of the vote provide.  
Constitutions in general, as well as the European constitution in particular, have a 
normative and institutional dimension.  The normative speaks to questions of value—
“ought” questions; the political speaks to issues of institutional design as well as 
pragmatic politics.  These two polarities, values and politics, structured public discussion 
of the European constitution in France and elsewhere.  Jurgen Habermas, German 
political philosopher and legal theorist, was one of the most vocal and consistently 
articulate advocates of the normative necessity of a European constitution (Habermas 
1996, 1997, 2001: Grimm 1997; Bellamy and Schonlau 2004).  Politicians, lawyers and 
social scientists dominated discussions of institutional design as well as practical 
exigencies.   
The normative and the institutional features are not so sharply divided as the 
foregoing discussion suggests.  In practice, the normative and the political bear a kinship 
relation to each other that becomes transparent when political leaders submit a 
constitution to citizens for their approval.  Constitutions do more than consolidate the 
legal status of a polity.  The character of the rules that a constitution outlines links the 
normative and the institutional in a way that implicitly evokes patrie—the emotional 
foundations of the polity. 
Political theorist Anne Norton (2003, p. 130) has argued that a constitution 
represents a “covenant” as well as a “contract.”  The “covenant” represents the pact with 
the past as well as a promise for the future whereas the “contract” suggests a field of 
regularized negotiability.  The “covenant” acts as a collective conversation whereas the 
“contract” acts as a body of rules.  When a democratic state submits a constitution to its 
people, the covenant dimensions of the constitution become salient.  Asking a people to 
vote “yes” or “no” on a document such as a constitution, does two things: first it forces 
political elites to explain to its citizens why they should accept a particular constitution as 
a national good; second, a popular vote on a constitution forces citizens to ask themselves 
a normative question—is this a document that we “ought” to support.   
A national popular vote on a constitution creates two events—the campaign for 
the constitution that elites mount—and a contingent event—the outcome that the citizens 
determine.  A public campaign for a constitution forces political leaders to articulate a 
repertoire of justifications or moral evaluations to its citizens and to submit the document 
to the test of collective recognition.  Lastly, it gauges the intensity of the affective bonds 
of the polity.   
Boltanski and Thevenot ([1991] 2006) have theorized the sociological logic of 
justification and moral evaluation.  Their central argument is that social actors 
continually employ a recognized language of evaluation to ascribe moral worth to a 
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 particular set of actions or situations.  Repertoire a term that social scientists have 
borrowed from theater and performance studies suggests a repeated (by the actors) and 
recognizable (to the audience) package of actions, signs and symbols (for example 
Berezin 1997).  Lamont and Thevenot (2000) have recently argued for the importance of 
“national cultural repertoires.”  From this position it is a swift theoretical leap to posit 
“national repertoires of political justification and moral evaluation.”     
Central to the theoretical claims of Boltanski and Thevenot is the argument that 
different realms have different repertoires of justification, expressed in appropriate 
linguistic terms.  For example, in the labor market sphere, it would be inappropriate to 
invoke kinship as a criteria of promotion.  In the case of the referendum on the 
constitution, we would expect to hear a language of justification and evaluation that is 
consonant with the political sphere—although we would expect different political parties 
to have different substantive positions on issues. 
But this only speaks to the political elites who made arguments about why 
citizens should vote “yes” on the referendum.  Citizens must accept or reject the 
constitution based on their evaluation of the document itself in tandem with the 
“justifications” that political elites offer to persuade them to do so.  Voting involves more 
than simply accepting or rejecting the justifications of elites.  Collective recognition 
governs the vote and speaks to the “covenant” nature of the constitution and the social 
language of rules.   
Sewell (1992) inspires much of what follows.  Rules are procedures not precepts.  
Rules are similar to syntax in language.  Syntax provides the rules of the formal ordering 
of words but it in no way determines either the content of spoken or written language.  
We do not understand either spoken or written language because we understand the 
syntax.  We understand spoken or written language because we understand or recognize 
the meaning of the words in the order in which they occur.  Written language is 
dependent upon syntax and grammar and relies on a rigid application of rules.  Spoken 
language is based upon a capacity to communicate in a social situation.  Anyone who has 
studied a language other than their own knows that spoken language is the most difficult 
to acquire.  In part because spoken language is less dependent upon rules than upon an 
intimate knowledge or recognition of the culture that the language reflects.  The sure test 
of knowing a rule, or a language, is the flexibility with which one can apply it in different 
situations, or the idiomatic use of the language. 
 A constitution is in many respects a document of rules—the “contract” 
dimension.  In those instances when ordinary citizens vote on a constitution, they vote on 
the “covenant” not the “contract.”  Lawyers, politicians and social scientists ponder the 
“contract.”  Philosophers and ordinary citizens ponder the “covenant.” The “contract” 
offers a syntax of the polity; the “covenant” speaks to national cultural repertoires.   The 
outcome of a popular referendum on a constitution lays bear the extent to which the 
document “speaks” the national language in a deep sense.  Whether citizens recognize the 
document as their own also speaks to the issue of collective emotion.  What matters is not 
whether the constitution is charismatic as a document, few legal texts are, but rather 
whether it carries the emotional valence of national affectivity.   
The above distinctions provide an analytic frame that permits the 
conceptualization of the event of the French referendum as a template of broader currents 
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 in French and European politics. 5   The contract/covenant duality inherent in all 
constitutions underscores a transparent but overlooked point that speaks to both the 
French and Dutch vote.  When the governing strata submitted the issue of Europe writ 
large to the people, they ultimately did not approve. The “no” vote made transparent to 
the governing classes just how remote and unpopular “Europe” was to ordinary citizens. 
Post-referendum Eurobarometer (European Commission 2005) data in France revealed 
that 61% of those who voted “yes” and 60% of those who voted “no” had decided on 
how they would vote at the beginning of the referendum campaign.  For this reason, what 
was claimed about the “non” after the vote is politically more important than the failed 
strategies that led up to the referendum.6  
 




The French vote on the European constitution did not fail due to lack of effort on 
the part of the government.  In fall 2004, the French government had reason to be 
sanguine about the outcome of the referendum.  A Eurobarometer poll (European 
Commission 2004) reported that 70% of the French people supported a European 
Constitution--although there was no specification as to whether it meant the Constitution 
that was actually on the table.  An IPSOS poll (2004) based on a representative sample of 
French 18 and older, taken in late September 2004, obtained results that were similar to 
the Eurobarometer poll.  Sixty four percent of the IPSOS respondents expressed support 
for the Constitution.  IPSOS disaggregated its data by political party and did not take into 
account whether the person polled actually intended to vote.  In this early poll, 66% of 
Socialists polled supported a “yes” vote.  In the referendum itself, only 41% of Socialist 
party members voted “yes” –a shift that analysts considered decisive to the defeat of the 
referendum.    
The European Commission and the leaders of its member states signed off on the 
draft of the Constitution on June 18, 2004.  A national popular referendum was a choice 
not a requirement.  A Parliamentary vote, such as the Italian and German governments 
held, would have sufficed to affirm the treaty.7   French President Jacques Chirac instead 
decided to call a referendum and announced it on the national holiday Bastille Day, July 
14, 2004.  The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a far-reaching television and 
                                                 
5    A constitution is as much a symbolic document as a legal document (see Weiler 1999; Siedentop 2000).   
In the fall of 2004 when it began to be clear that the French referendum might be problematic, Thomas 
Ferenczi (2004), editorial writer for Le Monde argued that the  European constitution was largely a 
symbolic document and that the popular acceptance of the symbols would be crucial to the success or 
failure of the referendum.  He listed three symbolic dimensions, first, naming the treaty a ‘Consitution” 
meant that the European “people” were an entity; second, the document created a European Minister of 
Foreign Affairs—suggesting that there could be a European diplomacy and military policy; and third, that 
there could be a “social economy of markets”—that is that Europe could be both “social democratic” and 
“neo-liberal” at the same time.     
6   For a compressed political analysis, see Hainsworth (2006) and Ivaldi (2006);  the essays in Perrineau 
(2005) provide useful statistical data.  
7   Chirac was criticized for signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 without submitting it to a popular 
referendum.  The referendum on the Constitution was a political ploy, an attempt to avoid the previous 
criticisms, that backfired. 
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 public information campaign that cost the government 10 million euros.  The 
Government created a Web Site that published the constitution, and all sorts of positions 
and questions about it.  A short 28 page pamphlet, The Essential Europe, what it brings 
us, what the Constitution changes [L’essentiel sur l’Europe ce qu’elle nous a apporte ce 
que la Constitution va changer] captured the spirit of the official public discourse.8   
Pictures of green fields and young people engaged in what appears to be cooperative 
activities punctuate the text written in power point style. 
From Chirac’s announcement to the actual vote, there were signs that a “yes” vote 
was not a given.  It seemed unimaginable that France, an architect of European 
integration from its inception in the post-war period, would reject a document crafted 
under the guidance of their own former President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing.  “Local 
knowledge” suggested that the treaty would pass at the margins as Maastricht had done in 
1992.  The center right, Chirac’s party, as well as the French Greens supported the 
Constitution.  The National Front, the Communist Party and the anti-globalization 
organization ATTAC actively campaigned against the Constitution.  In an article in Le 
Monde Diplomatique, publication venue of ATTAC, a journalist described the 
Constitutions as “the great leap backward,” a “road map for privatization” and a shrine 
for the “free market principle (Halilmi 2004).”   
The argument that the constitution was a “neo-liberal” text was redolent in the 
arguments of all the opposition parties even if they were in radically different political 
camps.  The French Socialist Party was divided on the issue of support for the 
Constitution.  In September 2004, Laurent Fabius declared that he would lead the 
Socialist opposition to the constitution.  In December 2004, the Socialist Party held an 
internal referendum on the constitution and voted 58% to support the Constitution.  The 
Socialist Party referendum placed the party and its leader François Hollande officially in 
the camp of the “yes” vote—even if in the end, the divided party sunk the Constitution. 
French national politics did not account for all of the problems with the 
acceptance of the constitution.  Every French household received a copy of the 
constitution in the mail.  The act of deciphering the 448 articles of “indigestible text that 
seemed voluntarily opaque” became, as one journalist described it, a “national sport.”9 
Pierre Encrevé, linguist and director of a committee to simplify bureaucratic language, 
described the text as “unreadable.”  Encrevé claimed without irony:  “I took six hours to 
read very attentively the 191 pages, and, truly, all the possible implications were not 
always apparent to me with clarity.  There are ambiguities and obscurities, but, for 
someone who has done secondary studies, it is less difficult to follow than Foucault or 
Bourdieu.” 10  
 
                                                 
8 http://www.constitution-europeenne.fr/fileadmin/allerplusloin/lessentiel_sur_leurope.pdf 
9 Eric Aeschimann , « Les Français toqués d’analyse de texte, »  Libération (Paris), 21 mai, 2005.  
10 Eric Aeschimann , « “L’impress d’opacité vient de l’absence de notice explicative, » Libération (Paris), 
21 mai, 2005. 
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 The “Oui:” April 21, 2002 as Iconic Event and Political Metaphor 
 
The polls conducted in mid- March 2005 began to indicate that the percentage of 
voters prepared to vote “non” was increasing.11  During this period, Chirac asked the EU 
lawmakers to tone down a provision in the constitution known as the “Bolkestein 
directive.”  The “directive” contained in the draft constitution allowed “service workers” 
to offer their “services” in any European country based on the fees that would be charged 
in their “country of origin.”12  The EU Parliament passed a watered down version of the 
controversial “directive” in February 2006.  Opponents of the treaty used the “directive” 
to generate images of “Polish plumbers” flooding into France offering their services at 
below market rate.   
 The “no” began rising in March and continued through early May where the polls 
indicated that both sides of the issue were coming close together.  But the “no” took off 
in early May and the “yes” never regained momentum.  As the numbers in favor of “non” 
climbed, French politicians exchanged reason for emotion, argumentation for threat, as 
they tried to “scare” the French into voting “yes.”  April 21, 2002, the date that Jean 
Marie Le Pen leader of the French National Front came in second to Jacques Chirac in 
the first round of the Presidential election, has become an iconic event in recent French 
history.  French politicians who supported the “yes” invoked April 21, 2002 as a political 
metaphor aimed at generating fear that would translate into support for the Constitution.  
French politicians that supported the “yes” vote presumably hoped that the French public 
would remember and relive the national choc of April 21, 2002 and vote “yes.”   
In contrast to the fantasy of waves of “Polish plumbers” who would presumably 
flood into France and deprive stalwart French plumbers of their jobs, April 21, 2002 was 
a political event that actually occurred.  “Polish plumbers” –a metaphor for cheap service 
work—was a possibility, not a lived national experience.  April 21, 2002 generated a 
collective emotional choc or shock among French citizens when they realized that Jean 
Marie Le Pen, a right wing populist, could actually become their President.  The threat to 
national honor that  Le Pen would pose if he were to become President, forced many 
citizens to abandon party lines and return Chirac to the office of President in the second 
round with an astounding 85% of the vote.13   
Shock and shame were not merely words in the public sphere on the morning of 
April 22, 2002, but viscerally felt public emotions written on the faces of the French 
citizenry.  Images of shame and shock permeated all forms of communication media.  A 
cartoon that appeared on the first page of Le Monde on April 23, 2002 displayed Le Pen 
as a propeller plane crashing into the twin towers of Chirac and Jospin with the Eiffel 
Tower intact in the background.  While it may have been in poor political taste to 
compare April 21 to September 11, the cartoon does underscore the intensity of public 
emotion that Le Pen’s position in the first round generated.  French politicians referred to 
April 21, 2002 in the months leading up to the referendum without ever mentioning Jean 
Marie Le Pen by name. 
                                                 
11   Perrineau (2005, p. 230) maps all of the polls that had appeared regularly in the French newspapers. 
12   The “directive” is found in the draft Constitution, Part III, Title III, Chapter 1 (section 2, subsection 3 
[articles 29-35]).  
13   Political analysis of the Presidential election of 2002 is voluminous.  See for example, Mayer (2002, pp. 
329-383) and the essays in Cautres and Mayer (2004). 
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 By April 2005, political metaphors saturated the French public sphere.  Françcois 
Bayrou, leader of the center right UDF (Union pour la Démocratie Française)  party, 
resorted to Biblical imagery to implore the French people to vote “yes.”  While 
addressing university students in Lille, a dissenting voice told Bayrou that he made it 
sound as if it would rain for forty days if the French voted no.  Bayrou responded, “I tell 
you in all the fibres of my being that it will rain for more than 40 days.”14  The rain 
metaphor invokes Noah’s Ark and the end of one world and the beginning of the new, but 
it also suggests Louis XIV, “After the ‘non,’ the deluge!”  On April 11th ,  German 
Foreign Affairs Minister Joschka Fischer came to Rennes with the French Foreign Affairs 
Minister to warn an audience that “The life of Europe was at stake.“15  
On the 15th of April, Jacques Chirac appeared on national television to promote 
the constitution before a live audience of French youth.  Uncomprehending when 
confronted by the fear and pessimism of the youth, Chirac implored:  “Do not be afraid, 
you do not have reason to have fear.”  The phrase “Do not be afraid” was identified with 
Pope John Paul II who first used it in 1979 on a visit to his native Poland which at that 
time was still behind the Iron Curtain.  John Paul II made the phrase, “Do not be afraid!” 
a central thematic of his papacy—using it on multiple occasions.16  The popular and 
charismatic Pope died on April 2, 2005.  Thirteen days later, Chirac borrowed his words 
in the hope that some of the Pontiff’s charisma would transfer to the European cause.  
Chirac was not the only French politician who had tried to appropriate the Pope’s 
charisma.  In 1997, Jean Marie Le Pen urged his party loyalists to “not be afraid” during 
his party congress speech in Strasbourg where he began the long process of 
“normalizing” the National Front in French politics.  
By the 20th of April, the French press and politicians sensing defeat became more 
strident in their warnings against a repeat of April 21, 2002.  For example, some 
politicians argued that if the French political classes had not reflected on the “lessons of 
April 21.”  A book, France that Falls [La France Qui Tombe] (2003) written by the 
economist and political commentator, Nicolas Baverez was worrying the French 
intellectual class.  Baverez argued that April 21, 2002 “was not accidental” and that 
France had to begin to meet the challenges posed by globalization on one hand and a 
disaffected middle class on the other if she were not to tumble into international 
irrelevance.     
As the third anniversary of the 2002 first round Presidential approached, 
politicians openly worried that a victory of the “no” would signal that politicians had 
never been able to overcome the challenges to France that April 21, 2002 had posed.17  
Pierre Nora, member of the French Academy and author of the multi-volume work on 
French identity and memory, Les Lieux de mémoire,  warned that “April 21 reveals a 
                                                 
14   Chombeau, Christiane.  “En cas de victoire du non, ‘il pleuvra plus de 40 jours,’ assure François 
Bayrou.”  Le Monde (Paris) 4 avril 05 (LeMonde.fr). 
15  Gaëlle Dupont and Jean-Baptiste de Montvalon..  « La campagne a déchaîné les passions françaises.”  
Le Monde (Paris) 28 mai 05 (LeMonde.fr). 
16  The words come from the Gospel of Matthew 6:9 in which Jesus tells Peter not to be afraid of calling 
upon God’s name.  John Paul II used the phrase repeatedly as a way to argue that God could be called upon 
in strictly secular matters (John Paul II 1994). 
17 Phillippe Ridet and Nicolas Weill.  “Le choc du 21 avril 2002 aura-t-il repliqué le 29 mai 2005? ”  Le 
Monde (Paris) 20 avril 05 (LeMonde.fr). 
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 profound shedding, a lowering of French influence, to which France has not adapted 
well.”  François Hollande, leader of the French Socialists, argued as if the connection 
between the 2002 Presidential election and the referendum was evident.  As the third 
anniversary of April 21, Hollande announced a new strategy:  “To save the “yes,” we will 
explain [to the French public] that a victory of the “non” will be a new April 21.” 
 When it began to look as if the French socialist vote would be the tipping point in 
the referendum, and that it was tending towards “no,” the Secretary of the German Social 
Democratic party Franz Muntefering came to Paris on May 2, 2005 and issued a joint 
declaration with François Hollande his French counterpart entitled, “One Europe 
soladaristic and social, strong for peace and justice in the world.”  The declaration began, 
“Europe is a magnificent and historic enterprise, for which we have struggled side by 
side, and for which we ought to continue in the future, to struggle together.”   The 
emissary from Germany was not auspicious as three weeks later the Social Democratic 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder called elections and then lost in October to the Christian 
Democrat Angela Merkel.   
 On the same day as the German secretary visited France, a group of German 
intellectuals that included Gunter Grass, Jurgen Habermas, Alexander Kluge and Peter 
Schneider among others, wrote an open letter to Le Monde (May 2, 2005) declaring that 
“Europe demands courage.”  Addressing themselves to the French citizens, or at least that 
portion of French citizens who regularly read Le Monde, they argued that France “home 
of the enlightenment” should not “betray progress.”  They ask, “Do the French people 
really want to be holed up in one bunker with right-wing and left-wing nationalists?”  
The coup de grâce occurred on May 7, 2005 when German philosopher and enthusiastic 
supporter of Europe Jurgen Habermas published an essay in French in Nouvel 
Observateur warning the French left of the dangers of voting “no” on the European 
constitution in the referendum. 18   Habermas chided the members of the left who 
advocated for the “no” as irresponsible because they put Europe in danger of being a 
colony of American imperial ambitions. 19   Laurent Fabius, the unremitting voice of 
opposition to the Constitution within the Socialist Party, did not help the Socialist 
strategy when he pleaded in public on May 8th for the French to vote “non” on the 
Constitution. 
 As May 29th was drawing near and the “non” remained decidedly ahead in the 
polls, the advocates of the “yes” intensified their public claims.  In the beginning of May, 
Chirac addressed French artists and argued that culture was the core of the new 
constitution.  To counter Fabius, Hollande argued, somewhat unconvincingly that, “on 
May 29 there will not be a second round.“—referring to Chirac’s 85% of the vote victory 
in the second round of the 2002 Presidential election, and again to April 21.20  On May 
26,   Nicolas Sarkozy, Chirac’s “take no prisoners” then Minister of the Interior, and now 
                                                 
18   Jurgen Habermas (1990, 1997, 2001), the distinguished German philosopher has been in the forefront of 
the movement for a constitution as a normative document in the project of Europe.  He also led the 
intellectual resistance to the war in Iraq in the summer of 2003 (see Levy, Pensky, Torpey 2005). 
19 Jurgen Habermas, “The illusionary ‘Leftist No’ Adopting the constitution to strengthen Europe’s power,” 
appeared in English on the Web Site (http://www.signandsight.com/features).    
20   Renaud Dély and Paul Quinio,  « Cette fois, il n’y aura pas de second tour”  Libération (Paris) 23 mai 
05 (Libération.fr). 
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 President of France, warned the French public to vote “yes” and “Don’t take Europe 
hostage.”21   
On the evening of May 26, with the polls suggesting that the European 
Constitution was veering towards defeat, Jacques Chirac made a final exhortation to the 
French public.  He argued that the French were voting not on a sectarian political issue—
that is that the referendum should not be on his Presidency--but on an issue that would 
determine the future of themselves, their children, France and Europe.  The referendum 
would show “the honor and vitality of democracy.”  Chirac solemnly intoned: “Above all 
we must not mistake the question [italics added].  The decision that is before us is far 
away from the traditional political cleavages.  It is neither right nor left [italics added].  It 
is not a question to say yes or no to the government.  It is a question of your future, your 
children’s future, the future of France and of Europe.”  The treaty would response to 
“changes in the world,” make Europe economically competitive “without any 
abandonment of our social model.”22
Chirac characterized the choice before French citizens as “neither right nor left.”  
His use of a phrase more commonly associated with Vichy displayed an uncharacteristic 
historical amnesia and suggests that Chirac and his party were grabbing at straws in those 
final days.  Tellingly, Chirac for the second time in less than a month, invoked a 
historical metaphor that Jean Marie Le Pen and the National Front had used earlier.  In 
1997, the theme of the National Front party congress in Strasbourg was “neither right nor 
left, French!”  During that event, the media drew the connection to Vichy.  “Do not be 
afraid!” “neither right nor left”  the Pope the past; the cross the fasces.  The confluence 
between Chirac’s and Le Pen’s choice of political metaphor is suggestive of the 
rudderless state of current French political thinking as well as the plasticity of political 
images and metaphors.   
 
Domesticating the “Non:” Hope, Fear and “People Like Me” 
 
The National Front’s campaign against the Constitution was deliberate but not 
characteristically outrageous.  Until the last few months, Jean Marie Le Pen absented 
himself from center stage.  From the beginning of the referendum campaign, election 
specialists assumed that National Front voters would determine the outcome of the vote.  
In an interview for Liberation three days before the vote, the Front’s election 
spokesperson Eric Iorio was confident that the National Front “will swing the vote 
towards the “no.”23  Pascal Perrineau, Director of the Center for the study of French 
Political Life at Science-Po, corroborated Iorio’s assertion, ”Any majority for the “no” is 
not possible without the FN.”24   
                                                 
21  Reuters News Service, « Nicolas Sarkozy :  ‘Ne prenez pas l’Europe en otage.’”  Le Monde (Paris) 26  
mai 05 (LeMonde.fr). 
22   Claire Ane, “Jacque Chirac exhorte les Français a ‘ne pas se tromper de question.’”  Le Monde (Paris)  




23 Christophe Forcari,   « Le FN s’atttribue déjà la victoire du non ‘social-national’, » Libération (Paris) 26 
mai 05, 12. 
24 Christophe Forcari,   “Une contribution décisive contre le traite, »   Libération  (Paris) 26 mai 05, 12. 
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 In contrast to the other members of the French political class, April 21, 2002 was 
a positive iconic event for the National Front.  The conflict between market rationality 
and national culture that dominated the public debate over the constitution coincided with 
the National Front’s standard repertoire of themes and narrative strategies.  Hope and 
fear, market and culture dominated the political posters that were plastered on billboards 
and public walls all over France in the period before the referendum.  The Socialists 
viewed the market as a source of progressive social change.  A Socialist Party poster 
proclaimed “5 Reasons to Say Yes to the European Constitution.”  A hand holding a red 
carnation, classic socialist flower symbol, lay inside the “O” of a “Oui” that was 
emblazoned in stark black script against a background of bold red.  The five reasons were 
rational and market driven.  According to the poster, a “yes” vote would ensure that 
France and Europe would be “more social, democratic, protected, efficient and stronger.”  
The emotional valence of the Socialist poster was weak compared to the strident National 
Front posters.  For example, a Front poster screamed out, “Turkey in Europe:  I Vote NO!  
I Protect France!”  Another Front poster proclaimed, “Délocalisations layoffs, A 
Solution:  The Nation.”       
The National Front had a more subdued and domestic poster that posited an 
alternative rationality.  The poster listed “fourteen good reasons to vote no” with a blond 
princess walking down an aisle in a wedding gown, next to an ugly frog king with a 
crown of EU stars on his head.  The logo was “Sometimes it is necessary to say NO!”  
The poster promised “14 good reasons to reject the constitution.”  It laid out standard 
arguments for the constitution with a corresponding argument against the reason.  Many 
of the fourteen reasons focused on economic issues and linked them carefully to national 
and social issues.  The poster was in pastels—shades of pink, yellow and blue.  It was 
childlike and playful.  The fourteen reasons have little cartoon characters with the frog 
king trying to sneak in his points.  Among these points was the widely held popular belief 
that the constitution could be amended if it proved unwieldy.  Eight of the fourteen points 
had to do with various aspects of an “economic war” that would ensue if the Treaty was 
ratified. 
The Princess/Frog captured an alternative vision of Europe and France as well as 
a softer more domesticated and feminine National Front.  Marine Le Pen, Le Pen’s 
daughter and heiress apparent, has long blond hair as did the poster princess and the 
softer language and domestic argument was attributed to her.  Recently, Jean Marie Le 
Pen appointed his daughter to a position of prominence in the National Front in an 
attempt to moderate its image.  In May 2003, in a New York Times interview, Marine Le 
Pen emphasized the importance of adding women and ordinary people to Front’s 
constituency.  She told the reporter, “My emergence is a signal that, ‘There are people 
like you in the National Front….70-year old men and traditional Catholics, and young 
female divorcees like me.’”25  Marine Le Pen has recently been polishing her image in 
preparation for the 2007 political campaign, as well as written her memoir, A Contre flots 
(Against the Tide).   
 
                                                 
25   Elaine Sciolino, “The New Face of France’s Far Right.”  New York Times April 27 2003, p. 16. 
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 Defending the National-Social:  Unemployment, Neo-Liberalism and the Boomerang of 
April 21, 2002 
 
In a phrase eerily evocative of the 1930s, Carl Lang the then third ranking 
member of the Directorate of the National Front told Liberation that the “national-social” 
would carry the “non.” 26    Lang was not unique in this assessment.  It was “local 
knowledge” as a Le Monde reporter argues, “Social Europe is the eternal weak point of 
the construction of the Union” (Le Monde 4/1/05).27  Lang attributed the weakness of the 
“social” within the constitution to the rupture in the Socialist party between an “in-grown 
left bourgeoisie” and a “popular traditional strata.”   The National Front was not alone in 
its attack on the neo-liberal or free market dimensions of the constitution.   The campaign 
against the Constitution created strange and unwilling bedfellows.  The anti-globalization 
group, ATTAC, and the French Communist Party were opposed to the treaty on virtually 
the same grounds as the Front.   The Socialist Party never overcame its internal split 
between those in favor of the market versus social Europe.  Indeed the split as Lang 
pointed out represented the bifurcated nature of its constituency.  Chirac and his party 
argued for both the national and neo-liberal dimensions of the Constitution.  Their slogan 
was “The Constitution would make France Strong.”   In contrast to ATTAC and the 
French Communists, the Front was uniquely positioned to champion the “national” and 
to attack neo-liberalism.   ATTAC and the Communists, no matter how anti-globalization 
they were, could hardly argue, as the Front did, “France First!”    
 In contrast to the French political class that warned against a repeat of April 21, 
2002, Jean Marie Le Pen and the National Front embraced the date as a positive iconic 
event.  In the two months proceeding May 29, Le Pen became more visible and the 
National Front began to graft the “no” vote onto a political strategy that looked ahead to 
the French Presidential elections of 2007.  Jean Marie Le Pen gave three significant 
speeches in the period before May 29.  Each of these speeches in various ways linked 
high unemployment rates to social and national issues.  On April 9, 2005, Le Pen’s  
addressed National Front representatives at a party convention in Strasbourg  where he 
blamed the European project for escalating unemployment and délocalisation—the 
movement of French industry abroad.  Le Pen proclaimed that “Europe is not a model of 
virtue.” 28    Le Pen emphasized the unemployment figures that later figured in the 
rejection of the constitution.  He argued that the unemployment figure was closer to 20% 
and not to the 10 % that the government typically reported.  Le Pen elaborated a 
complicated math that showed that in 1970 hardly 5% of the population was unemployed.  
He blamed escalating unemployment on plant closings and délocalizations-- in other 
words, structural unemployment due to globalization.  Interviewed at the Strasbourg 
convention, Le Pen said, he was convinced that, “The French, high and low [he is 
referring to social class here], will takes its revenge without noise and the result of the 
                                                 
26   See footnote 13. 
27   While the protection of the French social model was at the core of much of the opposition to the 
constitution, the threat that EU poses to traditional social policies is not unique to France.  For elaborations, 
see Offe (2003), Smith (2004), Rosenvallon (2000). 
28 http://www.frontnational.com/doc_interventions_detail.php?id_inter=34 
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 referendum will explode like a bomb on the night of May 29, May 29 will become the 
boomerang of April 21.29   
 The tour de force of the Front’s campaign against the Constitution was Le Pen’s 
speech on May 1. 30   The Front stages its annual public march on May 1 when it 
celebrates the feast of Joan of Arc—its patron saint.  Typically, the Front marches from 
the Palais-Royal up the Rue di Rivoli past the statue of Joan of Arc at the Place de 
Pyramide to the steps of the old Paris Opera house where Le Pen gives his annual speech.  
Le Pen’s May 1 speech is always topical--linked to the issue of the year.  Since 1997, he 
has increasingly emphasized globalization and linked it to an anti-Europe rhetoric.  
Europeanization and globalization have become virtually synonymous in Front parlance. 
The Front uses May Day to celebrate itself and Joan of Arc, patron saint of 
France.  Since Joan of Arc’s official feast day is on May 30 the appropriation of Joan on 
May 1 is a symbolic political move on the Front’s part to undercut the French and 
European holiday that celebrates labor.   Le Pen chose the day to argue for a Front vision 
of Labor.  When Le Pen founded the Front in 1972 Marxists and Communists were its 
principal enemy.  Immigrants followed in the late 1970s and 1980s.  Since 1998, Europe 
as an enemy of French labor has become a salient Front theme.   
Le Pen began his May 1, 2005 speech by blaming the “social democracy of 
Chirac and Jospin” that treats the people as “pack of lambs” for mass unemployment.  
Calling unemployment a “veritable cancer,” he argues that the “impotent and corrupt 
political class” uses the “European fantasy” as “an escape hatch from their 
responsibilities.”  Displaying the French penchant for history as political metaphor, Le 
Pen points to the false promise of the Popular Front in 1936 to bring “peace, bread and 
liberty to the French people.  Instead, Le Pen argues the Popular Front brought “ration 
cards , prison camps and deportations.”  He reminds his audience that members of the 
Popular Front  “threw the powers of the Republic into the hands of Marshal Pétain.”   
Le Pen evoked the memory of the Nazi occupation to deploy charges of anti-
Semitism against his critics—charges they usually deploy against him.31  Pointing out 
that in 2004, there were 280,000 legal and 150,000 illegal immigrants in France,  Le Pen 
argues that no one who makes this point should be labeled a “racist, xenophobe or anti-
semite!”  Le Pen continues:  “Europe is not prosperity, full employment, social progress, 
it is unemployment, the end of French enterprise!  This is the reality that they ask us to 
approve!”  Echoing Emile Zola’s J’accuse, Le Pen asks his audience “three questions”: 
“Do you want to renounce the independence of your country?  Do you accept to no 
longer be master of your destiny?  Do you accept a strange Constitution from which you 
will never be able to exit?”   Le Pen’s talks often run to fifteen typescript pages and as 
rhetoric they are remarkably well constructed even if long-winded.   
 The end of the May 1 speech displays a populist rhetoric that has a broader appeal 
than Le Pen’s more typical nationalist rhetoric.  The “people” is ultimately a more 
inclusive concept.  Arguing that the European constitution is “essentially materialist”, Le 
Pen asked his audience have you ever heard anyone cry “Long live ‘Europe’ except in a 
                                                 
29 Vie du Front, “No, je garde la France.” FDA (mai 2005, n. 402): 19.  A month later on May 21, the 
National Front held a colloquy on “France Confronts Délocalizations.”   
30 http://www.frontnational.com/doc_interventions_detail.php?id_inter=36 
31   Rousso (1991) points out that Le Pen has been obsessed with Vichy since the beginning of his political 
career. 
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 bank?”    Le Pen concludes, France is not only “supermarkets and statistics,”  France has 
a soul that is “laughter and tears, our prayers and songs, our errors and hopes.”  He ends 
on a sentimental note with an appeal to the French People, “peasants, workers, artisans, 
small business men, soldiers and functionaries.”  Le Pen concludes on a strong populist 
note:  “The poor more than the well to do need that a Nation that is powerful with 
inviolable frontiers.  The true internationals are the lords of the manor who exist from 
time immemorial.  The urban poor are also tightly bound to the pavement as peasants had 
been to the soil.”  
 
APPROPRIATING THE “NON”   
 
The “Choc” of May 29:  A Replica of April 21, 2002 
  
The day after the referendum, political scientist Pascal Perrineau, director of 
Cevipol (Centre d’etude de la vie politique francaise) described the referendum as a 
“replica of April 21, 2002.”  He assessed the vote as reflecting fissures in French political 
alignments as well as broader anxieties about the end of a French way of life.  Perrineau 
described the vote as: “the vote of all of the contentious: extreme right, extreme left, 
communist Party, the other half of the socialist electorate.  It is a sign that the socialists 
are yet part of a culture of government and a culture of rupture.  But their vote responds 
also to a logic of opposition…..This referendum translates the French anxiety about 
identity ; Europe is not as interesting as the prolonging of France. There is also post-
enlargement malaise.  This is the first time that France has said no to Europe since 1956.  
It is also the first divorce of the French German couple.32  
Serge July, founder and editorial commentator of Liberation, provided a harsh 
and realistic assessment of the vote in terms of French political history.  In his post 
referendum editorial, entitled “Illusions in distress,” he argued that the referendum was 
another instances of a “revolt” that had been gaining momentum since the Presidential 
elections of 1995 when Jean Marie Le Pen came in third in the first round with 15% of 
the vote.33  July marks the legislative elections of 1997 and April 21, 2002 as part of  this 
not so silent “revolt.”  He argued that the French political class has failed to adequately 
assess the impact of a 10% unemployment rate that has remained constant for the period 
between 1986 and 2000.  The social implication of the steady state of unemployment is 
that there is a generation of French youth who have lived their entire lives with the results 
of structural unemployment.  Given this fact, it is not surprising that Chirac confronted 
pessimism when he met with the French youth on national television.  What was 
surprising was that as President of France, he did not grasp the generational effect that 
fourteen years of youth unemployment generated.  Eurobarometer (European 
Commission 2005) data support July’s analysis as the only age group that voted strongly 
in support of the treaty were persons aged 55 and over (54% yes.)     
During the same time period 1986 to 2000,  July reported “the national debt 
passed 100 million euros, and external commerce plunged.”    According to July, three 
fatal illusions dominate French political thinking: first, that the state can do all, that is 
                                                 
32   Interview with Pascal  Perrineau, “Ce referendum est un replique du 21 avril 2002.”  Le Monde (Paris) 
30 mai 05 (LeMonde.fr). 
33   Serge July, editorial, « Illusion en perdition. »  Libération (Paris) 31 mai 2005 (Liberation.fr). 
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 that the “the 30 glorious years” have not ended; second, that France still caries weight in 
global international relations; and third, that the French voted down the treaty because it 
was neo-liberal.  These are “illusions” that “fall hard.”  The implication of July’s 
argument was that the rigidity of French assumptions about the world and the nation has 
placed France in danger of stagnation in all spheres.   
The French political class had good reason to engage these illusions to mitigate 
the shock of the defeat of the Constitution for which they had campaigned so hard and 
which the majority of French citizens rejected.  With the exception of Paris and its 
suburbs, the “non” vote carried across France and even appeared in regions that had been 
supportive of Europe in the past.  The demographer Hervé Le Bras argued that the spatial 
pattern of the vote suggested that the political geography of France had changed.  France 
no longer had left or right regions but simply “poor” regions—and the poorer the region 
on a number of standard indices the less likely were its residents to support the Treaty.  
Le Bras concluded that it was time to take seriously the idea that there were “two 
Frances.” 34  
Parties and politicians that had supported the Constitution spoke in a restrained 
manner on its demise.  On the evening of May 29th, when it was clear that the referendum 
would fail to pass, French President Jacques Chirac addressed the nation and said that the 
French had “democratically” expressed themselves with a “sovereign decision.”  Chirac 
said that in the spirit of democracy he would respect the choice even though he did not 
agree with it.  He also agreed to take heed to the “uncertainties” and “expectations” that 
the French expressed during the public discussion of the Treaty.35  
François Hollande, General Secretary of the Socialist party, observed that French 
citizens were consulted and participated in the referendum.  Hollande argued that the 
French made a “major political decision” that will “engage us for a long time.  It [the 
French vote] will be a danger for Europe but mostly, “…the vote translates above all the 
growth of a profound crisis that is crossing our country.”36   Hollande argued that the 
current  ruling group was unable to meet the challenges of the country.  Hollande feared 
that France would be held responsible for the “demise of Europe.”   With the 2007 
Presidential elections in mind, Hollande exhorted his fellow Socialists whose “no” votes 
were widely perceived as defeating the treaty:   “Europe must not be a victim of the 
interior disorder of the French and the profound malaise in our country.  Europe must 
once more be rediscovered as a source of hope for its peoples and not a source of 
mistrust.”    According to Hollande,  the solution is that “… socialists, French socialists, 
European socialists—must meet this great challenge of the continent, to French socialists 
to be there for their country to give it a perspective, a sense, a direction, a hope and to 
make, tomorrow, to win the left to a project that will be credible, engaging and sincere.” 
 
                                                 
34 Le Bras (1998) had previously tracked the relation between demographic change and the emergence of 
the extreme right. 
35 http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/discours_et_declarations/2005/mai/declaratio 
n_du_president_de_la_republique_suite_au_referendum_sur_le_traite_constitutionnel_europeen.29995.ht
ml   
36 http://www.ouisocialiste.net/article.php3?id_article=970 
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 The Hope of May 29  
 
It was somewhat disingenuous of Hollande to speak of the Socialist party as the 
source of hope for a re-vitalized France in a new Europe.   The raw numbers that became 
available after the referendum suggest that it was the division between the Socialists on 
the issue that clearly cost the “oui.”  Socialist Party adherents voted 59% “non” versus 
41% “yes.”  In contrast in 1992 for the referendum on the Maastricht treaty, Socialists 
voted 76% “yes.”  In the 2005 referendum, the French Communists and the National 
Front voted “non” in roughly the same proportions—95% and 96% respectively.  In 
1992, the Communists voted 16% for Maastricht whereas the Front only voted 7% in 
favor of Maastricht. 
The advocates of the “no” spoke out energetically in the post-referendum period.  
The French Communist Party, the anti-globalization group ATTAC and the National 
Front, as odd an ideological trio as one would wish to see, viewed the “no” as a well 
spring of political possibility.  
On May 31, Marie-George Buffet head of the French Communist Party declared, 
“A great hope arose today.”  She argued that May 29, 2005 had “the dynamic of a 
popular coming together that evoked the great moments of the Popular Front or of May 
68.”  The rejection of the Constitution signaled that France demanded the “abandonment 
of the ultra-liberal projects of Brussels.”  
On its Web Site, the anti-globalization group ATTAC declared that the rejection 
of the Constitution ushered in the “springtime of France”--an allusion to 1848 and the 
“springtime of peoples,” ATTAC proclaimed, “The French people came to write a page 
of history.  For the first time in fifty years, they expressed their refusal to see Europe 
constructed on the sole basis of market criteria and objectives.  For the first time in thirty 
years, the people affirm their will to put an end to disastrous politics, neo-liberal 
intrigues.”  After the Dutch vote, ATTAC exuberantly referred to France and the 
Netherlands as the two black sheep of Europe.   In a front page article in Le Monde 
Diplomatique, Ignacio Ramonet who 7 years earlier had proclaimed, “let’s disarm the 
markets,” announced that the “no” signified “a rebel France who honored its tradition as 
a political nation par excellence.  She saved the Old Continent, and aroused a new hope 
of peoples and the anxiety of established elites.”37     
On the day after the referendum, the National Front called for the resignation of 
Chirac.  The Front Web Site displayed a poster that proclaimed, “The People Spoke:  
Chirac Resignation!”  Le Pen’s message on the night of May 29 was relatively sober:   
“The French people have clearly said NO to the Constitution of the European Union and 
also refused the feudalization of France to a supranational State.  They rejected the 
construction of a Europe that was neither European, nor independent, nor protective. . . .  
They re-affirmed the political independence of France and its sacred right to provide for 
itself.”  Le Pen advanced his own cause as he criticized the government:  “The President 
of the Republic and the Government, which was involved without reserve in the 
campaign in favor of the YES, have been clearly disavowed.  The Front National appeals 
to the French people to unite to confront the grave difficulties which are the consequence 
                                                 
37   Ignacio Ramonet,  “Espoirs,”  Le Monde Diplomatique 52 (June 2005): 1.   For a discussion of the 
founding of ATTAC,  see Ancelovici (2002) ; for a discussion of its influence in France see the essays in 
Wieviorka (2003). 
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 of politics followed for thirty years, and to promote indispensable reforms for the defense 
of our fundamental national interests.”  Marine Le Pen accompanied her father on French 
television and joyously remarked, “This is the first time that I have gone on television to 
comment on a victory.”38  
While the French Communist party and ATTAC were invoking the revolutions of 
1848 and 1968, the National Front invoked its own revolution--April 21, 2002.  In the 
spirit of revolutionary exuberance, Le Pen urged his supporters to attend the party Fête, 
Bleu Blanc Rouge: “United as a Front, we will be able to open the path of renewal that 
our people desired from April 21, 2002 to May 29, 2005.”39  Riding the emotional wave 
of the twin victories of April 21, 2002 and May 29, 2005 the Front’s annual Fête Bleu 
Blanc Rouge unofficially began Le Pen’s 2007 Presidential campaign.   In many respects, 
the National Front won even though Le Pen lost on April 21, 2002.  For Le Pen, May 29, 
2005 and April 21, 2002 signaled the beginning of a new political era.  These dates also 
signaled that the governing classes had mis-read two political facts: first, that the 
“people” supported the idea of Europe—writ large; and second that the National Front 
was an extreme and irrelevant political actor. 
 
Fête Bleu Blanc Rouge 2005:   Le Pen Le Peuple 
 
Riding the emotional wave of the twin victories of April 21, 2002 and May 29, 
2005 the Front’s annual Fête Bleu Blanc Rouge unofficially began Le Pen’s 2007 
Presidential campaign.40     Named after the colors of the French flag, the Fête Bleu 
Blanc Rouge, or BBR as the Front refers to it, began in 1981 as a symbolic challenge to 
the French communist party’s Fête de L’Humanite that takes place every year in early 
September in the park of the Courneuve on the outskirts of Paris (Berezin 2007).  Party 
festivals common to Mediterranean Europe provide an opportunity for local party leaders 
to fraternize with national party elites (See Kertzer 1980 on Italian Communists).  The 
Front uses its annual Fête to entertain its base--or at least as much of its base as was able 
to afford the trip to Paris required to attend.  There are food stands representing the 
cuisines of France’s regions, evening dances, folk performances during the day and a 
Roman Catholic public mass on Sunday morning.    
 The Front traditionally held its Fête on the periphery of Paris in the Pelouse de 
Reuilly a park on the northern side of the Bois de Vincennes.  After its permit was denied 
in 2003,  the Front moved the festival in 2005 to the exposition hall at Le Bourget a 
suburb of Paris.  Le Bourget is on the same RER commuter train line that tourists take to 
Charles De Gaulle airport--although tourists probably take the express that conveniently 
skips all the stops in the ex-urbs.  The trip on the local train is grim.  The landscape 
deteriorates as the train leaves central Paris and travels toward the industrialized ex-urbs 
of Paris.  The train to Le Bourget travels through the area that was in flames during the 
weeks beginning on October 27, 2005.  As the train pulls into the local stations, French 
Communist Party posters recruiting new members dominate the platforms.  Le Bourget, 
                                                 
38   Christiane Chombeau, «  Le FN célèbre la victoire du non, mais s’interroge déjà sur 2007. »  Le Monde 
(Paris) 31 mai 2005, 9. For Le Pen’s speech see,  
http://www.frontnational.com/doc_interventions_detail.php?id_inter=38.   
39 Jean Marie Le Pen, “ Chacun a son poste!” FDA (septembre 2005, n. 406):  3. 
40  I attended the Fête  Bleu Blanc Rouge at Le Bourget on October 8 and 9, 2005.     
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 and areas similar to it, is fertile recruiting ground for left and right.  Beset by both 
immigrants and urban poverty, Le Bourget was an odd location for the Front fête. 
The National Front provided free buses that picked up Fête participants at the 
RER station in Le Bourget and transported them to the large exhibition hall on the 
outskirts of the town.  The domesticated version of the Front, as represented by the frog 
and the princess poster, appeared in another incarnation at the exhibition hall where a 
large silkscreen rendition of the Fête poster adorned the building.  The festival poster 
featured a blond child, a young boy of no more than three years, with the colors of the 
French flag painted on his face.  The theme of the Fête, “French Pride” is superimposed 
above the face of the child.   
Fête literature, pamphlets and flyers have the phrase “Passionately French” on 
them.  The Front describes the Fête as a meeting of “Friendship” and displays itself as 
welcoming to every one—from immigrants who assimilate to children in Iraq.  
Unemployment and outsourcing figure in the posters.  However, the dominant images are 
of youth and the future--a requisite for a party headed by a 78 year old man.  Le Pen’s 
wife, Jany, founded an organization named SOS Enfants d’Irak.  She visited Iraq to offer 
food and supplies to suffering children and photographs of her visit dominate several of 
the exhibition booths.   
In contrast to the earlier Fêtes, the 2005 event had toned down its images of 
blatant racism and energized its constituency.  The Front’s security guards dressed in 
black still hand search the bags of everyone entering the Fête.  The Front has added metal 
detectors to its security procedures.  Post 9/11, metal detectors are not particularly 
remarkable.  A cadre of party members who do not look either shabby or dangerous have 
joined the elderly Frontists and tough looking youth who traditionally frequent the Fête.  
While one would not mistake the crowd at the Fête for the fashionable denizens of St. 
Germain, in contrast to the past, the younger Frontists seem almost stylish.  The 
appearance of the participants suggests that a more middle aged and slightly more 
educated group is augmenting the Front’s traditional lower middle class constituency. 
In addition to the usual fare of faux history tracts that focused on Joan of Arc and 
Clovis, the bookstands also displayed more policy oriented works, such as a book of 
interviews with Bruno Gollnisch, La reaction c’est la vie!;  a book on the 2002 
presidential election, Le Tour infernal 21 avril-5 mai 2002:  Analyse d’une fantasmagorie 
electorale;  and a  book on plant closings,  Dé localization: ce n’est pas une fatalité!, 
actes du c 
Hebdo, the Front’s party newspaper for the week of 6 to 12 October, was “Viennese 
Waltz and Turkish March.”  The front page featured a cartoon of a red faced Turk with 
beard and excessively hooked nose, wearing a red hat with a saber in pocket.  The Turk’s 
teeth are sharp and protrude out as if to bite the visibly terrified Alpiner with whom he is 
dancing.  On the inside pages of the newspaper is an article entitled “Betrayal of Europe” 
referring to the discussions on the terms of Turkey’s entry to the EU that began on 
October 3, 2005. 
 Le Pen’s speech on late Sunday afternoon is the traditional high point that closes 
the Fete.  In 1998, Le Pen spoke in open air to a group of mainly elderly persons.  With 
little technology to support his speech in 1998, he spoke to an audience that consisted of 
principally empty seats.  He ended the 1998 speech by giving medals of distinction to 
Front members who had loyally served the party.  The honorees were white haired and 
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 the general feeling in 1998 was one of old age and decay.  Viewed against the Le Pen’s 
1998 speech, his closing speech in 2005 was astonishing.  At Le Bourget, there was 
standing room only in the closed auditorium that accommodated about 5000 persons.  
The event was highly choreographed.  The room was strobe lighted with red, white and 
blue—the colors of the French flag as well as the name of the Fête.  A chorus of youth 
dressed in white tee shirts that said Le Pen Le Peuple marched up and down on the stage 
and waved French flags.  This was the first time that this event would be televised as the 
head of TC1 41 said it was unfair to give air time to all the other declared presidential 
candidates and not to Le Pen.  A Front functionary led a warm up session.  On both sides 
of the stage were large television screens that captured the images on the stage for those 
in the back of the auditorium.  Party volunteers handed out small French flags to 
members of the audience.  
 Le Pen entered the auditorium to emotional chants of “President, President, 
President!”  His speech continued the theme of the national and the social that he and his 
party had begun in the spring.42  Le Pen’s speech focused on unemployment and the 
failure of the present French government to ameliorate its effects.  Le Pen attacked the 
Socialists for “30 years of disaster”—making ironic reference to the trente glorieuses.  Le 
Pen points out that France is “paralyzed” due to just about everyone who is not him.  He 
labels his main competitor on the right, as the “duplicator” and asks Bruno Mégret and 
his constituency that had broken away from the Front in 1999 to return to the fold.     
 He saw France’s only hope in a break with the past that would lead to a “French 
renaissance and the defense of workers and the French people.”  The audience responded 
with shouts of “President, President!” to his call for a “true revolution.”   He took up the 
issues of immigration, attacks “droit du soleil,” the right to become a citizen if you are 
born on the territory.  He resurrected the old Front adage that French nationality must be 
“inherited or merited.”  He re-iterated the Front’s support of “national preference” for 
French citizens.  His support of the 1905 law that separates Church and State places him 
with the governing class that on the recommendations of the Stassi commission in 
December 2003 banned the wearing of religious symbols in public schools in spring 
2004. 
 Le Pen asserted that the presidential elections of 2007 would determine the new 
future of the French people.  Le Pen promises to run against all those who have “lied, 
mislead and betrayed the French people for three decades.”  His conclusion is strong and 
emotional.  In contrast to his more strident and intensely nationalistic appeals of the past, 
Le Pen’s appeal focuses on security and democracy as twin elements of a re-constituted 
people’s France.  He abandoned the microphone and the podium and moved to the edge 
of the stage to literally shout out his closing lines: 
 “We lance a fraternal appeal to all those who have the sentiment of having been 
tricked, deceived, abandoned, to those who are discouraged and even desperate.  You can 
take your revenge and win with us the battle of France.”  Wraping himself in the 
language of Article 2 of French Constitution, Le Pen cries out: “The Republic is the 
government Of the People, By the People,  For the People-- French people, who have 
                                                 
41   Despite the presence of the television cameras, or perhaps because of it, the festival received sparse 
coverage in the press the next day.  
42 http://www.frontnational.com/doc_interventions_detail.php?id_inter=3 
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 done many things and who can yet do so much more for the good of France, of Europe 
and the World.  Arise and march for the combat for the Victory of France!”   
    “Le Pen/Le Peuple” flashed on the screens where Le Pen’s image had been and he 
called his decidedly youthful team of party supporters up to the stage.  The youth in white 
tee shirts and French flags served as a chorus in the background on the stage, white 
confetti and balloons of blue, white and red dropped from the ceiling.  Le Pen and his 
circle broke into La Marsellaise and asked the audience to join in.   The conclusion was 
focused and emotional.  Amid the snowfalls of confetti the flashing blue, red and white 
lights and the singing of the national anthem one felt a flow of emotional energy in the 
crowd—that was frighteningly real. 
 
THE MULTIPLE CONTEXTS OF THE “NON” 
 
Event as Political Metaphor 
 
April 21, 2002 was a plastic political metaphor from which diverse French 
political actors could fashion a distinct public narrative.  The intersection of a contingent 
event, the “non” vote and the public narratives that it generated analyzed within the 
context of recent French and European history illuminates the landscape of political 
possibilities in France.   
 At the immediate level, the emergence of April 21 as a political metaphor during 
and after the referendum suggested deep fissures within the French political landscape.  
April 21 was a negative memory for all except supporters of the National Front.  Yet, it 
had no meaning if nothing was done to overcome the conditions that led to Le Pen’s 
second place showing in 2002.  Invoking the memory of April 21 and the emotions 
associated with it was not a particularly propitious strategy on the part of the French 
political elites.  It suggested that reason had failed in defense of the referendum and the 
only tact left to take was to frighten French citizens into supporting the referendum.  It 
was doubly wrong headed because it placed in the public sphere a date that only the 
National Front could deploy as a positive event.  In short, by invoking April 21 and 
playing to the politics of fear, French leaders suggested desperation rather than strength. 
 Second, the language of justification and moral evaluation imploded.  Usually, 
politicians use different metaphors to convey political meanings that suggest radically 
different criteria of evaluation.  In France, political language collapsed and politicians of 
left and right used the same words to mean different things.   For example, when Chirac 
characterized the choice before French citizens as “neither right nor left,” he used 
language more commonly associated with Vichy.  “Neither right nor left, French!” was 
the slogan that the Front National used to describe its political ethos. 
 On the other end of the political spectrum, the argument that the Constitution was 
a neo-liberal document was advanced by  the extreme left and right as well as the anti-
globalization group ATTAC.  In the end, the ambivalence towards the Constitution 
represented in the split in the Socialist Party created an opportunity for those who were 
not ambivalent to come to the fore and advance their views.  In the end it was not 
“neither right nor left” that prevailed but rather right and left. 
 The politics of fear and the implosion of political language pointed to deep fissure 
in the French and European political landscape on all sides of the political spectrum.   
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 Choc-ing  Events:   From April 21, 2002 to May 29, 2005 
  
French citizens, or at least those groups of citizens, who supported the 
constitution were in shock when it went down in defeat.  The palpable shock and feeling 
of distress that was visible on the faces of French politicians and citizens was a replay of 
the shock of April 21, 2002.  The French media represented both events—Le Pen’s 
coming in second in the first round of the 2002 Presidential race and the defeat of the 
constitution—as political earthquakes.   
 The “chocs” of April 21 and May 29 are less shocking when situated within the 
context of a broader stream of events in France and in Europe.  Jean Marie Le Pen and 
the National Front still carry the patina of ill-repute as well as the intellectual antipathy 
of the professional classes towards its lower middle class constituency (Mayer 2002).  
The Front National and its supporters are virtually synonymous with racism and 
xenophobia in public discourse.  But this is a view that was more descriptive of the 
Front’s past then its present.  The Front continues to have elements of racism and 
xenophobia, such as the opposition to Turkey’s entry to the European Union.   Le Pen 
still at times makes the politically outrageous comments that were characterized his 
speech in the early 1980s through the late 1990s.  His opponents frequently cited Le 
Pen’s statement that “the gas chambers were only a detail of the history of the Second 
World War.”   In January 2005, in a newspaper interview he commented that the 
“German occupation was not particularly inhuman” and that the Gestapo merely 
protected the French people.43  In February 2005, Le Pen said that in the future France 
would have 25 million Muslims and not 5 million and that Muslims would rule France.   
For this remark, the Paris court of Appeal fined him 10,000 euros for inciting racial 
hatred.  Being fined was a way of life for Le Pen.  However, he also incurred the wrath of 
his daughter Marine Le Pen as these remarks went against the Front’s goals of 
normalizing itself within French politics.    
 Even in view of Le Pen’s occasional outbursts, much has changed since the 
National Front began in 1972 in response to the events of May ’68.  The National Front’s 
first bêtes noires were Marxists and Communists--not immigrants and Muslims.  In short, 
the National Front has a history and a trajectory.  First, the National Front is no longer 
reducible to racism and xenophobia.  Second, the French state itself has been moving its 
policies on immigration and nationality increasingly in the Front’s direction
 Beginning in 1997, with its party convention in Strasbourg, the National Front has 
been putting itself forward as a serious electoral alternative.  The Front’s hope to 
normalize itself (banaliser) in the minds of the French electorate has been the fear of the 
center left and center right.  Normalization is not an unusual course of action.  Any 
politician or political party that hopes to win elections cannot speak only to the extremes.  
Thick or extreme commitments are for party militants and ideologues.  As Sniderman and 
his collaborators (2000) have demonstrated with regards to race and political attitudes in 
Italy, voters’ political values exist independently of their party preferences.  The Front 
                                                 
43   Christiane Chombeau.  “Pour M. Le Pen, “l’occupation allemande n’a pas ete particulierement 
inhumain.”  Le Monde (Paris) 13 janvier (LeMonde.fr)  
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 National has been riding the crest of the wave of political events and attracting thinly 
committed voters who share its positions on issues rather than its ideological package.44   
 In 1998, the National Front made a strong showing in the regional elections that 
shocked the French public and mobilized other political parties into action against Le Pen 
(Perrineau and Reynie 1999).  In January 1999, the National Front suffered an internal 
split.  Bruno Mégret, Le Pen’s second in command, departed with his faction of 
technocratic and moderate Frontists to found a competing party—the MNR (Mouvement 
national republicain).  In June 1999, Le Pen and Mégret split the extreme right vote in 
the European Parliamentary elections.  Le Pen’s Front received only 6% of the votes and 
Mégret’s 3%.  Charles Pasqua and Philippe de Villiers ran a “soverentiste” list that 
received 13% of the vote and captured much of the anti-Europe sentiment of the Front.45 
The split in the National Front between Le Pen and Megret  combined with the 
subsequent weak showing in the European elections led political analysts to conclude 
that, if the Front was not entirely gone from the French political scene, its days of 
political influence were over.   
 Contrary to expectation, the Front began to grow rather than contract in influence 
as the new millennium began.  Nineteen ninety nine was the end of the beginning, rather 
than the beginning of the end, for the National Front. Without giving him credit (a source 
of endless irritation to Le Pen) left populist and centrist politicians began to articulate the 
Front’s less extreme positions.  Voices outside of as well as within the political 
establishment began to attack globalization and the neo-liberal market as well as launch a 
defense of French culture and identity.  In 1999, the idea that Europeanization and 
globalization were iterations of the same economic processes began to become part of a 
broad public discourse in France and throughout Europe.   
 The anti-globalization group ATTAC founded in Paris in 1998 were vociferously 
anti-Europe (Ancelovici 2002).  Their debut political mobilization was the event that they 
organized in Nice in December 2000 to protest the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  The 
farmer activist Jose Bove led a group of farmers who dismantled a McDonalds that was 
under construction in Millau, France.  In 1999, Jacques Chirac refused to allow France to 
sign the European Charter of Minority and Regional Languages—an EU initiative to 
promote the preservation of regional languages.  Chirac’s action though less flamboyant 
than Bove’s made a similar point.  According to Chirac, signing the Charter would 
require a revision of the French Constitution that made French the language of France 
and threaten one of the “grand principles of the Republic.”  In short, the legal affirmation 
of regional languages threatened French identity and political cultural practices.  
Events in the national and international arena turned in directions that served to 
benefit the Front politically.  In 2001,  Jean Marie Le Pen had the good sense to remain 
silent after 9/11 and to extend condolences to the United States.  Le Pen and the Front 
                                                 
44   The literature on the National Front is voluminous.  In French, see Camus (1996); in English see, 
Holmes (2000).  Schain (1987) is the classic account of the Front’s rise to electoral prominence.  Numerous 
accounts of the right as a phenomenon devote chapters to the National Front, for example, Kitschelt (1995); 
Betz (1994); Givens (2005).    
45   In 1994, Philippe de Villiers founded the Mouvement pour La France (MPF).  In 1999 for the European 
elections, de Villiers joined with Charles Pasqua in the Rassemblement pour la France (RPF) in contrast to 
the Rassemblement pour La Republique (RPR) the center right party to which Chirac belonged.  The RPF 
represented the anti-Europe wing of the center right.  The MPF is the National Front’s principle competitor.  
Le Pen frequently calls de Villiers an “ersatz.” 
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 were on the same side of the Iraq war issue as the French government.  Le Pen’s wife 
went to help the children of Iraq.  In foreign affairs, Le Pen and the French political 
mainstream were on the same side of many issues.  In December 2002, much to the 
chagrin of Le Pen and his party, Chirac’s Minster of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy 
instituted a tough law on crime with a view towards containing illegal immigrants.  In 
December 2003, the government appointed Stassi commission recommended the banning 
of the wearing of religious symbols in public places—which in practice meant the French 
public schools.   
The French state itself has displayed a peculiar ambivalence to various 
dimensions of  Europeanization.  France as a founding member of European Union was a 
strong supporter of the Constitution.  Former French President Valéry Giscard  D’Estaing 
headed the committee that drafted the constitution.  On the other hand, the French state 
has repeatedly pulled back from Europeanization in ways that support national identity 
over European identity.  The banning of the headscarf is the most prominent example, but 
the regional language issue was a more telling if less prominent instance of retreat.   
 
BETWEEN ZOLLVEREIN AND PATIE: INTEREST, CULTURE AND THE 
EUROPEAN PROJECT 
 
French politicians of all stripes represented the referendum as a choice between 
rationality and culture, market and nation—Zollverein and patrie. 46   The public 
discussion of the constitution in France, before and after the referendum, underscored the 
peculiarities and contradictions that are constitutive of the expanding process of 
European integration.  For example,  when the European Commission ran a competition 
to determine who would design the euro bills, they listed as a prerequisite for 
consideration that artists submit designs that featured buildings and landscapes that 
looked European but were not recognizable as to place (Berezin 2006a).    Unlike the 
placeless spaces on the euro bills, Europe is a place of nation-states (Entrikin 1991).  
Citizenship in a member nation-state is a pre-requisite for European citizenship. Citizens 
of Europe are first citizens of established nation states.47   
A central tension of the European project lies in its attempt to re-conceptualize 
political space (Ansell 2004,  Katzenstein  2005, Agnew 2005) within the territorial 
boundaries of existing nation-states.  In contrast to 19th century nation state projects 
which aggregated smaller, territorial units, the expanded project of Europeanization 
disaggregates and re-aggregates established national political space.  Dis-aggregation and 
re-aggregation has political and social consequences (Berezin 2003).  On the macro level, 
European integration dis-equilibrates the existing mix of national cultural practice and 
legal norms that govern European nation-states. For example, the National Assembly 
voted on February 28, 2005 to amend the French constitution in order to legally call  the 
referendum on the EU Constitution.48  On the micro-level, European integration violates 
                                                 
46   Berezin and Diéz Medrano (Forthcoming) outline this discussion in the literature. 
47    The literature on post-nationalism (for example, Soysal 1994, Deflem and Pampel 1996) and the 
viability of the nation state (essays in Joppke 1998; Paul, Ikenberry and Hall  2003) debates the substantive 
significance of this fact. 
48   The Constitutional amendment is Title XV “On the European Communities and the European Union 
(art 88-1 to 88-5). 
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 long-standing habits of collective national attachment.   At the practical and emotional 
level, the combination of macro and micro dis-equilibration made the Constitution project 
vulnerable to the appeals to economic uncertainty and national identity that proponents of 
the “non” skillfully deployed. 
In the past, discussions of national sovereignty and identity, always central to 
European unity, were restricted to the governing strata.  In short, European integration by 
threatening to make the national space “unfamiliar” to many citizens opens the door to 
contestation of all sorts.  For example, in the elections for European Parliament in June 
2004, the abstention rate was 45.3%, even higher in the former Eastern Europe where 
only 155 million out of 350 million possible voters voted.  Anti-Europe, or Euro-skeptic, 
parties did well (Perrineau 2005).  In general, Europeans were more interested in the 
finals for the European soccer matches that overlapped with the voting.  The French and 
the Dutch rejection of the Constitution is another iteration of a growing popular rejection 
of re-identification as Europeans.  
 
“LE PEN SAID IT!”:   MIS-READING, POLITICAL POSSIBILITY AND THE 2007 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION   
 
 As of mid October 2005, there were 14 declared candidates for the French 
Presidential election in 2007.  Journalists were already speaking of the “risk of a new 
April 21.”49 Among the declared candidates and their parties, only the Front could claim 
the “choc” of April 21 and the “choc” of May 29 as non-chocs--genuine expressions of 
French public opinion.  The “non” on the constitution was one of several events of recent 
years that suggested that the Front voiced opinions held by French people in general—
and not a minority of xenophobic extremists.  The “chocs” of April 21 and May 29 
presented the Front with an unanticipated possibility.  The Front was able to position 
itself favorably vis a vis the major French structural problem—unemployment.  By never 
having been in power, the Front was one of the few political parties that French citizens 
blamed for unemployment.  The Front’s capacity to ride the wave of the “non” coupled 
with a newer younger generation of  professional and articulate party operatives 
positioned the Front well to capitalize on the thin commitments of French voters upset 
with the apparent lack of direction and capacity of the ruling French politicians.   
 On October 27, 2005, the riots began in the French banlieues and presented 
another possibility to Le Pen and the Front.  The riots were another “choc” to the French 
political elite.  Repeated collective “shocks,” April 21, May 29, October 27, suggested 
collective misreading.  I am using the term misreading in a traditional and not in any 
post-modernist sense.  We are shocked when we have not seen what is coming.  We mis-
read the situation.  Events may be contingent but they are never completely unpredictable 
for all social groups and observers.   
 My point here is not that Le Pen and the Front would win the Presidential election 
in 2007, but that by Fall 2005 it was not beyond imagining that he once again could come 
in second—which would have been as destructive as if he won .  Nor is it my point that 
the project of Europe is finished.  Rather, I am identifying a social and political fact here 
that social analysts as well as French politicians ignore at their peril.  In contrast to other 
                                                 
49   Phillipe Ridet, “Dix-huit mois jusqua’a la presidentielle, et déjà quatorze candidats. »  Le Monde (Paris) 
10 octobre 05 (LeMonde.fr).  
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 parties, the Front National had not been misreading.  On the contrary, it had been reading 
the general public mood very well.  The Front’s desire to place itself in a more nationalist 
centrist position coupled with it’s strategy of domestication and softening as represented 
by the child on the poster, Marine Le Pen, the princess and the frog suggests that it may 
no longer be accurate to categorize them as simply representing the politics of the refus—
those left behind by society (Perrineau  and Ysmal 2003). 
Europe has provided a context for the National Front’s progress.  Contingent or 
unexpected events have opened a realm of possibilities.  The National Front has benefited 
from the force of events from unemployment to Islamic fundamentalism.  The burning of 
the banlieues on the outskirts of Paris was another opportunity and the Front did not miss 
it.  A week or so into the riots the Front posted a video on their Web Site that opened 
with the words “Le Pen said it.”  They also prepared a poster with that phrase.  The video 
was  produced for the European Parliamentary elections of 1999.  With Tchaikovsky’s  
1812 Overture playing in the background, the video showed Paris burning.  Symbols of 
decay—an American Coca Cola can to represent globalization, a daisy to represent the 
Socialists, a sunflower to represent the Greens—were strewn about the violated French 
landscape.  In the video, only the Front was portrayed as triumphant--saving a Europe of 
Nations from the onslaught of globalization, Europeanization and immigration.   
The Front claimed to have doubled its membership in the weeks after the riots.  
Jacques Chirac waited until November 14th to respond to the riots and to address the 
French nation directly.   He said that the riots represented a “profound malaise” in the 
nation and a crisis of “sense,”  “direction,” and “identity.”50    Even though he said that 
law and order was the first charge of the Republic, Chirac appeared as weak as he had 
appeared when he addressed the French youth the previous April.  Le Pen was energized 
and he appeared the next day on the steps of the Palais Royal reminding everyone that he 
had indeed “said it” and that immigration left unchecked would create disaster.  
 Until the riots in the banlieues, the Front listed the rejection of the Constitution as 
their principal political victory.  The riots provided Le Pen with the opportunity to say 
that he was correct about the twin problems of immigration and unemployment.51  As one 
observed the helplessness of the French political class in face of the riots; coupled with 
the collective head hanging after the “non,” it was not unimaginable that the first round of 
the Presidential election in 2007 could bring another “choc.”    
On December 8-9, 2005, the French polling agency Sofres (2005) issued the 
results of a survey that showed that Le Pen’s ideas had taken hold among roughly 38% of 
the French population.  Of most concern in newspaper reports was that the percentage of 
persons who considered Le Pen’s ideas unacceptable had declined and the number who 
considered his ideas merely excessive had increased.  These figures make sense when 
viewed within the context of earlier Sofres surveys.  For example, Sofres tracked public 
opinion as to whether French citizens thought that Le Pen’s ideas represented a “danger 
to democracy.”  Between 1983 and 1998, the percentage of persons who thought that Le 
Pen’s ideas were a threat climbed steadily from 44% in 1984 to 73% in 1998 (Mayer 
2002, p.453).  What should have been of more concern was that while only 33% of the 
                                                 
50  http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/interviews_articles_de_presse_et_ 
interventions_televisees./2005/novembre/declaration_aux_francais.32000.html  
51   The Front had less to say about the student riots in March against the CEP.  They tended to regard the 
March events as further evidence of the incompetence of the French political class. 
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 population thought that he could get to the second round of the 2007 Presidential 
election, youth between the ages of 18 and 24 and employees disproportionately thought 
that Le Pen could succeed.  A poll taken on the fourth anniversary of April 21, 2002 
revealed that 35% of the French public viewed the National Front as “enriching political 
debate.”52
The fear of Le Pen as opposed to his actual candidacy dominated the Presidential 
election of 2007 in ways large and small.  It is not clear that the Socialist party would 
have run Segolene Royal if they were not determined to come up with a truly “different” 
candidate—an insider who was an outsider by virtue of gender.  If it were not for Le Pen, 
it is not clear that Nicolas Sarkozy would have been able to wage such a tough law and 
order campaign.  If it were not for the fear of another April 21, 2002, the fringe parties 
would have acquired more votes in the first round.  In the waning days of the presidential 
campaign, the French press and politicians—left, right and center—warned of a repeat of 
April 21, 2002, just  as they had in the Constitutional referendum.  The 2007 Presidential 
election marked the culmination of the various social and political trends that had pushed 
Le Pen closer to the center of French politics.  By spring 2007, Le Pen’s message had 
become detached from the messenger.  He received only 11% of the vote in the first 
round—his lowest score since 1972.  April 2007 was most likely Le Pen’s last act,  but 
Sarkozy has surely taken a page or two from his playbook.      
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